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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3)0) (2002).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 provides in relevant part:
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of unlawful
detainer:

(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in
the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained
premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case is an unlawful detainer action involving a large manufacturing facility
for fiberglass water treatment tanks and facilities. Benedict Bichler ("Bichler") agreed to
lease the facility to DEI Systems, Inc. ("DEI"), but when DEI failed to pay rent, Bichler
filed this action on March 21, 2006. R. 1. Because it is undisputed that DEI failed to pay
rent for the premises at issue, Benedict filed a motion for summary judgment on July 10,
2006. R. 42. In response, DEI contended that it had a right of setoff against its rent
obligations. R. 85. However, the district court properly rejected this contention and held
that, as a matter of law, DEFs claim for setoff arose under a separate agreement and was
"not a proper counterclaim under Utah's unlawful detainer statute." R. 440.
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bichler. R. 438-41.
1

The court entered judgment against DEI on February 23, 2007. R. 463. DEI had
previously filed a notice of appeal on December 18, 2006. R. 354. DEI remains in
possession of the Leased Premises during this appeal.
Statement of Facts
The following facts were undisputed1 in the summary judgment proceedings
before the district court:
1.

On or about May 1, 2003, Bichler entered into a lease with DEI (the

"Lease") covering real property located at 1235 South Pioneer Road, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84104 (the "Leased Premises"). R. 46, 84-85.
2.

The Lease required DEI to pay $ 15,382.00 a month in rent and other

charges. Id
3.

DEI failed to pay the rent for the Leased Premises beginning on February 1,

2006. R. 47, 84-85.
4.

Thereafter, Bichler provided DEI with written notice that it had failed to

pay rent for the month of February 2006. Id

1

In response to the factual allegations set forth in Bichler's motion for summary
judgment, DEI made the conclusory statement that it disputed DEFs facts "to the extent
that they state or imply that DEI improperly withheld rent payments from Bichler, that
DEI owes Bichler any money under the Lease, that DEI is in unlawful detainer of the
leased premises, or that DEFs right of setoff is invalid." R. 84-85 (emphasis added).
First, this statement goes only to the legal effect of the facts set forth by Bichler and in
no way creates a dispute as to the underlying facts themselves. Second, DEFs response
did not "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e).
2

5.

On March 14, 2006, Bichler caused DEI to be served with a Three Day

Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate ("Notice to Quit") pursuant to, and in compliance with,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-3 and 6. Id
6.

As of the date of Bichler5s summary judgment motion, DEI had wholly

failed and refused to pay Bichler rent that was due and owing under the Lease for the
months of February through July of 2006 in the sum of $92,298.30. Id
7.

As of the date of Bichler's summary judgment motion, DEI also owed late

fees in the amount of $9,229.83 and interest in the amount of $4,845.75. IdL
8.

Despite not paying any rent from February of 2006 to the present and being

served with the Notice to Quit, DEI remained in possession of the Leased Premises as of
the date of the summary judgment motion. Id. In fact, DEI remains in possession of the
Leased Premises during this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court appropriately granted summary judgment in this case because it
is undisputed that DEI failed to pay rent for the premises at issue and DEFs asserted
defense for its nonpayment of rent fails as a matter of law.
Specifically, DEI attempts to excuse its nonpayment of rent by contending that it
has a right of setoff against its rent obligations. DEFs contention fails, however, because
the alleged right of setoff is not a proper defense to the unlawful detainer action. Moreover,
even if a right of setoff could be asserted in an unlawful detainer action, DEFs right of
setoff fails because it lacks the required mutuality of obligation. Furthermore, the alleged
right of setoff is controverted by the plain language of the Lease.
3

ARGUMENT
Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statue (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-1 to 12.6) "grants the
landlord a summary court proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated some express or
implied provision of the lease." P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Utah 1991)
(emphasis added) (recognizing that one of the purposes of the law is to provide a speedy
resolution of the issue of possession). In this case, it was undisputed that DEI failed to
pay rent for the Leased Premises. The district court correctly ruled that DEI's alleged
right of setoff is legally insufficient to excuse its nonpayment of rent and that Bichler was
entitled to a summary proceeding and to immediate possession of the Leased Premises as
a matter of law.
I.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT DEI FAILED TO PAY RENT FOR THE
LEASED PREMISES AND THAT BICHLER PROPERLY SERVED DEI
WITH A NOTICE TO QUIT,
Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statue provides five situations in which the tenant is

deemed to be in unlawful detainer, including non-payment of rent by the tenant while
remaining in possession of the leased premises. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(c).
Specifically, a tenant is in unlawful detainer:
When [the tenant] continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in
the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained
premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due.
In this case, it was undisputed that DEI has not paid any rent since February of
2006. Several weeks after DEI first defaulted in its rent payments, Bichler served DEI
with a Notice to Quit, which formally notified DEI that it had three days (after service of
4

the Notice) to pay the outstanding rent or, in the alternative, surrender the Leased
Premises. It was undisputed that DEI received this Notice to Quit and it is evident that
the Notice complies with Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-36-3 & 6. Thereafter, DEI undisputedly
failed to pay the outstanding rent (and ongoing rent) and yet it continued in possession of
the Leased Premises. Thus, as a matter of law, the district court correctly ruled that, as a
matter of law, DEI was in unlawful detainer of the Leased Premises pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-36-3(l)(c).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DEFS ASSERTED
DEFENSE TO THIS ACTION FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
DEI alleged in the district court that "DEI has a valid right of setoff which is a proper

affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer claim." R. 81. However, the district court
properly ruled that this alleged right of setoff, is legally insufficient to excuse DEPs
nonpayment of rent because: (A) the alleged right of setoff is not a proper defense to the
unlawful detainer action; (B) even if a right of setoff could be asserted in an unlawful
detainer action, DEFs right of setoff fails because it lacks the required mutuality of
obligation; and (C) in any event, the alleged right of setoff is controverted by the plain
language of the Lease. Among other things, the district court correctly ruled that DEFs
setoff claim "does not arise in the same transaction or business" as the Lease, and that the
setoff claim is therefore not available in this summary proceeding. R. 466 at 34. This does
not mean that DEI may not assert its claims in the separate action that it has already filed
but only that the claims may not be used to deny Bichler the right to obtain speedy

This action is styled Bevan v. Environmental Services Group, Inc., et al., Civil No.
060901974, and it is pending in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah.
5

resolution of the issue of possession of the Leased Premises.
A.

DEPs Alleged Right of Setoff Is Not a Proper Defense to the Unlawful
Detainer Action.

One of the main purposes of Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute (Utah Code Ann. §§
78-36-1 to 12.6) "is to provide a speedy resolution of the issue of possession." P.H.
Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
counterclaims were initially not allowed at all in unlawful detainer actions because
adjudicating counterclaims would curtail a speedy determination of the right to possession.
Id, In 1951, however, the Utah Supreme Court (in a short per curiam opinion) stated that
certain counterclaims would be permitted in unlawful detainer actions. Id, (citing White v.
District Court, 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951)). Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court found that
in order to "promote judicial economy, a 'proper counterclaim arising out of the same
transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint5 could be asserted in an
unlawful detainer action." Id, at 1021 (quoting Lincoln Financial Corp, v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d
1102 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added).
A "proper counterclaim" is one that satisfies the concept of "dependence of
covenants." Id, Dependence of covenants in the landlord-tenant context involves a
situation in which the landlord has failed to perform a promise "contained in the lease"
which may excuse the tenant from performing his duties under the lease. See Restatement
(Second) of Property § 7.1 (emphasis added). Such typically involves a breach of the

6

warranty of habitability,3 or retaliatory eviction. While the issue appears to be one of first
impression in Utah, other state courts have found that a right of setoff is not a valid
counterclaim or defense to an unlawful detainer action. See, e.g., Colonial Tri-City Ltd.
Partnership v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc., 880 P.2d 648 (Ariz. App. 1993); Motoda v.
Donohoe, 459 P.2d 654 (Wash. App. 1969).
In any event, DEFs alleged right of setoff in no way concerns Bichler's failure as a
landlord to perform any duty he owed under the Lease. DEI does not even allege that
Bichler failed to perform his duties as a landlord under the Lease. Rather, DEI contends
that because Bichler failed to perform certain duties under a separate agreement (the
"Purchase Agreement") whereby Bichler sold 80% of his interest in DEI to ESG, DEI is
entitled to offset the rent it owes under the Lease. Such a contention lacks the required
dependence of covenants under the Lease and, therefore, is not a valid defense to this
unlawful detainer action.5
On appeal, DEI contends that the alleged setoff is proper because it "aris[es] out of
the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the [wrongful lien] complaint."
Brief of Appellant at 13 (quoting P.K Investment, 818 P.2d at 1021). However, even if
3

See, e.g., P.K Investment, 818 P.2d at 1020-21.

See, e.g., Building Monitoring Systems, Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah
1995).
5

Indeed, DEI attempted to consolidate this unlawful detainer action with another pending
case encompassing ESG's claim that Bichler breached the Purchase Agreement. In
support of its motion to consolidate, DEI argued that the right of setoff arising from
Bichler's alleged breach of the Purchase Agreement would have to be litigated in both
cases if such were not consolidated. The court handling the other case denied DEFs
motion to consolidate seemingly acknowledging that any right of setoff arising from
Bichler's alleged breach of the Purchase Agreement was not a valid defense to the
unlawful detainer action. R. 51, 74-76.
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DEFs very broad interpretation ofthe "same transaction" test were appropriate, DEI's
asserted counterclaim fails to satisfy the P.H. Investment's general test as the alleged setoff
does not arise from the same transaction as the subject matter ofthe complaint at issue.
Specifically, the Complaint concerns only DEFs failure to pay rent and its continuing
possession ofthe Leased Premises. R. 1-5. DEI attempts to make its alleged right of setoff
relevant to the Complaint by contending that the Lease and an employment agreement
(allegedly breached by Bichler) are part ofthe "Transaction Documents" encompassed by
the Purchase Agreement and the Purchase Agreement authorizes DEI to setoff payments
due to Bichler against any amounts owed by Bichler under any ofthe Transaction
Documents. Brief of Appellant at 15.
The problem with DEFs contention, however, is that the Purchase Agreement states
specifically that only the "Purchaser" is entitled to setoff certain payments due and owing
to Bichler. R. 265. The Purchase Agreement clearly defines the "Purchaser" as ESG and
not DEI. The district court appropriately refused to broaden the definition of "Purchaser"
to include both ESG and DEL See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) ("if a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must construe the
writing according to its plain and ordinary meaning.").
Thus, DEI has no setoff right under the Purchase Agreement that would allow it to
setoff monies owed under the Employment Agreement against monies owed under the
Lease. Consequently, DEFs alleged damages under the Employment Agreement are
unrelated to its rent obligations under the Lease. See Nork v. Pacific Coast Medical
Enterprises, Inc., 140 Cal.Rptr. 734 (Cal.App.3d) (finding that a tenant may not claim an
8

unrelated debt owed by the landlord as a setoff for rent). Therefore, DEFs alleged
damages resulting from the Employment Agreement do not "aris[e] out of the same
transaction or business as the subject matter of the [C]omplaint." P.H. Investment, 818 P.2d
at 1021. Hence, DEFs affirmative defense that it has a right of setoff fails as a matter of
law, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Bichler.
B.

Even If a Right of Setoff Could Be Asserted in an Unlawful Detainer
Action Generally, DEFs Particular Claim Fails Because It Lacks the
Required Mutuality of Obligation,

Even if a right of setoff were a valid defense to an unlawful detainer action in
general, DEFs particular alleged right of setoff fails because the requirement of
"mutuality" is lacking. As stated in Mark VII Fin. Consultants v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130,
132 (Utah App. 1990), mutuality of obligation is required for the pleading of a setoff.
This requirement "allows parties that owe mutual debts to state the accounts between
them, subtract one from the other and pay only the balance." See Blacks Law Dictionary
at p. 1404 (8th ed. 2004); see also, Manchester Premium Budget Corp. v. Manchester Ins.
& Indem. Co., 612 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that "mutuality of parties [is]
'an essential condition of a valid set-off or counterclaim. That is, the debts must be to and
from the same persons and in the same capacity.5"). However, in this case, the alleged
right of setoff does not concern any mutual debts existing between DEI and Bichler.
Rather, DEI seemingly contends that Bichler (as the seller, a shareholder, and a
former employee of DEI) owes ESG money damages under the Purchase Agreement, and
that, therefore, DEI is entitled to set off rent monies it owes Bichler (as the landlord)
under the Lease. However, the Purchase Agreement was executed by ESG, and not DEL
9

Indeed, DEI is not even a party to the Purchase Agreement. The reverse is true of the
Lease, which was executed by DEI, and not ESG. Indeed, ESG is not even a party to the
Lease. Thus, the required mutuality of obligation is lacking as a matter of law and
therefore DEFs alleged right of setoff has no bearing on this action.
Indeed, a contention similar to the one made by DEI was specifically rejected in
Norkv. Pacific Coast Medical Enterprises, Inc., 140 Cal.Rptr. 734 (Cal.App.3d). In
Nork, the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against the tenant for nonpayment of rent. The tenant defended against the unlawful detainer action by contending
that the landlord owed money to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the tenant (which claim
had been assigned to the tenant) and that the money owed by the landlord should be
setoff against the unpaid rent. Id. at 736. The court rejected the tenant's argument
finding that the claimed debts of the landlord were unrelated to the lease and to
possession of the premises; the court also noted that adjudication of the claimed debts
would be too time-consuming for the summary nature of a unlawful detainer action. Id.
at 737.
Similarly, DEI contends that because Bichler may owe ESG monies, ESG's
subsidiary (DEI) should be entitled to set off rent it owes to Bichler. The alleged setoff
monies are unrelated to the Lease or possession of the Leased Premises. Finally, the
adjudication of the alleged right of setoff would be too time-consuming and, thus,
adjudicating the issue in the present context would completely undermine the summary
nature and purpose of the unlawful detainer statute.
In sum, as a matter of law, DEFs alleged right of setoff does not provide it with a
10

valid defense to this unlawful detainer action. The district court did not err in granting
Bichler's motion for summary judgment.
C.

The Alleged Right of Setoff Is Controverted By the Plain Language of
the Lease,

Finally, even if a setoff claim were appropriate in an unlawful detainer action, and
even if there were mutuality between the parties and alleged obligations asserted by DEI,
DEFs claims were still correctly denied by the district court as a matter of law. DEI's
contention that it has the right to off set monies Bichler allegedly owes ESG against
DEI's rent obligations is controverted by the plain language of the Lease itself. The
Lease specifically provides that "a material default" occurs upon:
[DEFs] failure to pay any rent, additional rent, or other payments of money
to be paid by [DEI] as provided in the Lease strictly within the time
provided and in the amount as required by the terms of this lease and the
failure to perform continues for ten (10) days after written notice that said
payments are due.
R. 60. The Lease does not provide for any right of setoff against the aforementioned rent
obligations. Thus, as it is undisputed that DEI has not paid any rent since February of
2006, it is evident that DEI is in material default of the Lease.
The district court properly refused to alter the Lease and allow DEI to interpose a
setoff defense in this action, as such a defense is clearly not contemplated by the Lease.
See U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("a
court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves;
furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself)
(citation omitted.)
The Lease nowhere even implies that DEI may be excused from its rent
11

obligations as a result of Bichler's alleged deficient performance as an employee under a
wholly separate agreement. DEI attempts to rely on paragraph 25 of the Lease to suggest
that such an offset may exist. Paragraph 25, however, does not creette any setoff or other
rights—rather, it simply provides a process by which the lessee may be asked to certify to
a third party through an estoppel certificate the validity of the Lease, that the lessor has
complied with the Lease, and that the lessee is not intending to assert any legal defense or
offset to enforcement of the Lease. (See Lease at ^f 25.) This estoppel language could not
reasonably be read to create a right of setoff that is not already provided elsewhere in the
Lease or by law. The Lease simply does not provide for the right of setoff asserted by
DEI (nor does the law). Consequently, DEI is not entitled to such a right of setoff. See
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("a court
may not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves;
furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in ruling that, as a matter of
law, DEI has defaulted in its rent obligations.

12

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court
in this matter.

n\
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